PAHRA has taken seriously the task, from the very beginning of its identification by the European Union‟ Needs Assessment, of establishing the National Monitoring Mechanism (NMM) so as to prevent and breakthrough impunity.

Even earlier, through the Alliance campaign efforts of sweeping and specialized human rights education followed by establishing formations of human rights defenders (HRD), particularly at the grass-roots communities in difficult situations, PAHRA was contributing to the foundations of a NMM. Even much earlier, PAHRA has pointed out the potential of and championed the putting up of the Barangay Human Rights Action Centers (BHRACs) and enhancing the capabilities of the Barangay Human Rights Action Officers (BHRAOs) in documenting human rights violations as well as monitoring compliance of State obligations starting at the most basic political unit. PAHRA had helped and is helping in the training of some of the BHRAOs. Nonetheless, an assessment of CHR‟s flag-ship project that includes the present situation of the BHRACs and of the capabilities of the BHRAOs in relation to their inclusion into the NMM.

Absent the formal structures of an NMM, the CHR has acted, for most of civil society, the primary and main mechanism to receive nation-wide complaints of human rights violations and to monitor to a certain extent the compliance of State bodies and institutions towards the resolution of such incidences. The assistance of the Presidential Human Rights Committee (PHRC) was later increasingly sought to link victims and families to the appropriate government agencies and concerned security forces. A de facto NMM exist, albeit has lots of room for improvement and enhancement, and with both formal and informal relationships between government, security forces and civil society.

None of the representatives of organizations and institutions in the convened body for the setting up of a more formal and elaborate NMM is devoid of experience in the monitoring of hr violations. No one is operating in a vacuum. In fact, the opposite is true, i.e., the aggregate experience is very rich and varied. From the introductions of the first meeting, it initially reveals that institutional strengths and best practices are to be enhanced, procedural gaps need to be filled up and shortcomings and possible errors should be addressed resolutely with due diligence.

It is with this background that PAHRA presents its grave concern and consequent call.
To contextualize PAHRA‟s concern, may it be recalled that:

Last March 29, together with CHR, PAHRA has conducted a Case Conference on EJK/ELK, Enforced Disappearance and Torture with the concerned Regional Command officers and personnel of both the AFP and the PNP in San Fernando, Pampanga. The process and content of the said Conference had enthused all parties concerned that the same were unanimously recommended to become an integral part of the about-to-be-set-up National Monitoring Mechanism. It was certainly reinforcing goodwill and transparency to become an institutional structure to prevent and/or to break impunity.

In April 4, PAHRA wrote a letter to Chairperson Etta Rosales to follow up on the agreed upon action of all parties sending copies of their own institutional report regarding the cases taken up in the March 18 Conference to the National Legal Department of the CHR. Copies were furnished both heads of the AFP and the PNP HR Offices. Not a single report from either the AFP or the PNP had yet been submitted on that date.

Up to the last NMM meeting and even up to this present date, no single report has been submitted to the Legal Department of the CHR. Promises of submission to CHR have been
POSITION PAPER ON THE NATIONAL MONITORING MECHANISM (NMM)
made. We are running on the third month of non-submission of already-written reports that are just to be photocopied and sent to CHR.

This is to share with you another case pertinent to the point PAHRA is stressing. It is a very recent joint effort of PAHRA and the AFP HRO in monitoring actions made after a report from a PAHRA member organization, Aniban ng mga Manggagawang Agrikultural (AMA), was made stating that from June 1-3 Army and CAFGU armed personnel were making a „census‟ in several barangays in Malolos, Bulacan, which was also a vilification campaign against legal organizations, AMA and SANLAKAS, as well as naming some persons, some of whom are PAHRA‟s HRD Para-legals, being linked with the New People‟s Army. This „census‟ and vilification campaign by both uniformed and non-uniformed Army and CAFGU personnel was capped last June 6 by “inviting” several individuals to go to the Bgy. Niugan detachment and talk with a certain “Sgt. Mendoza”.

These incidences along with the initial data gathered were shared with Col. Domingo Tutaan of the AFP HRO to hasten proper responses to the ensuing fear both to the “census-ed” communities/barangays in general and to the named individuals in particular. It is not unknown to the community that these actions could be the start or basis for later possible arrests, torture, enforced disappearances and extra-judicial killings – a continuing climate of fear and impunity left in Central Luzon by then Gen. Jovito Palparan, Jr.1

Col. Tutaan immediately made his own inquiries. He has shared this finding in a text message:
THIS IS THE INITIAL INFO I GOT: [Sir gud pm. Request be informed that 70ib (cadre) is maintaining a cafgu det at brgy panasahan, malolos, Bulacan composed of –caa. det comdr is not surnamed mendoza. there is also no det in brgy niugan. further be informed that alleged sgt. Mendoza is neither assigned nor connected to the unit sir. for info.] COMMENT: PLS TRY TO GET ADDTL INFO ON THE MATTER AND THIS „SGT MENDOZA‟ ESPECIALLY FM THE SOURCE OF REPORT. ADDTL INFO WILL HELP US CHECK VERACITY OF REPORT. I‟M CHECKING W/ OTHER UNITS IF THERE IS A „SGT. MENDOZA‟ IN THEIR ROSTER. (emphasis ours -PAHRA)

This was a conflicting fact with what has been reported by our PAHRA HRD-Para-legal, Alex Caparas, that he has personal knowledge of the existence of a detachment in Brgy. Niugan.

Last June 7, PAHRA Chairperson Max M. de Mesa, and AMA HRD-Paralegal, Alex Caparas, went to the area to resolve these seeming contradictory reports.

They saw the detachment. They met and talked with not-in-uniform „Sgt. Espinosa‟ and guard on duty, ISF Jayron Ray U. Martin.

They have explained the reason for their coming, including some reminders of the IHL Law provisions. And handed them a PAHRA calling card as well for, according to „Sgt. Espinosa‟, security reasons. The military have denied conducting the „census‟ and vilification campaign. After a cellphone call, the HRD-Paralegals were quickly referred by „Sgt. Espinosa‟ to go to the 70 IB headquarters in Hagonoy to get the answers to our further questions besides giving his incomplete name.

What has to be monitored for the resolution of such a report?

TFDP has already been requested to help in the systematizing, collating and transmitting the documentation of the incidences to the regional CHR office and other appropriate national and international bodies.

But who is the command responsible for the „census‟ cum vilification campaign? Who are the „census takers‟ as they have not registered with the Barangay regarding this „activity‟?

What are the post-operational / activity reports of the involved unit(s) that could be compared later to that of the CHR and the CSO fact sheets?

Who is this „Sgt. Mendoza‟ that could possibly be in-charge of the „census‟ operation and of ordering CAFGUs to „invite‟ at will members of the community to go to the supposedly „non-existent‟ detachment and talk with a „not-accounted-for‟ „Sgt. Mendoza‟?

Why is the detachment put up in a populated area even as it was supposedly requested by the Mayor due to the high crime rate prevailing in the area? Is this situation an exemption to the IHL law?

While the incidences are not high-profiled, we have shared these to you so as to gain deeper insights into and to draw lessons from the actual operations of the internal mechanisms of institutions and organizations involved because there is a sequel to the above incidents.

On the same day, the military contacted Mr. Caparas first inviting him to the detachment but then giving in to a dialogue the following day in the Matimbo Barangay Office instead. A certain Sgt. Mendoza, who must be in the 70th IB roster, accompanied Sgt. Espinosa to the meeting. Mr. Alex Caparas was joined by two Barangay Captains.

Mr. Caparas reported that as a whole the dialogue was good because according to the military the reason why they wanted to talk with people in the list was just to tell them that the listed people need not worry because the military wanted to change the bad image that Gen. Palparan left behind.

Later during the day, Alex called and added that the military said: “Napagalitan kami ni Col. Tutaan. Kapag nagsumbong kayo ulit, tutuluyan namin kayo.” He then asked if the filing of cases against the military could be deferred. We then understood that fear got a grip on Alex for he then left his home, made himself scare and very difficult to contact. If this, proverbially, happens to the green, what more to the dry.

As we have stated in our previous communications to the CHR, if these actions are precedents of what are to be our common endeavors towards the prevention and/or the breaking of impunity of EJK/ELK and Enforced Disappearances, we in PAHRA are afraid that the present spent efforts and resources for establishing the National Monitoring Mechanism may be an exercise in futility. The NMM may become a mechanism monitoring incidences of violations not towards their effective prevention of or breaking through or resolution of impunity of EJKs / ELKs, enforced disappearances and torture but rather may devolve into a mere mechanism of documenting events leading to or just plainly perpetrating violations with impunity. It may become another bureaucratic layer and an archive for impunity. Further, in establishing NMM there is urgent need to move from complaint-led approach to program-led approach. In this important instance, the two institutions of the security forces / uniformed services decisive for the success of the NMM are, in the least, seem to be having serious internal difficulties in implementing their obligation of due diligence. The resolution of these difficulties, hopefully, could later contribute enormously to the effective operations of the NMM. The jurisdiction of NMM should never exclude the security forces.

In the light of the above, PAHRA takes the position that we should:
 Suspend the process of putting together the NMM and its Technical Working Group until said reports have been satisfactorily submitted, so as to show collective seriousness that compliance with due diligence is an integral factor for the success of the NMM beginning with the efforts to resolve the HR cases presented in the March 18 Case Conference. Please refer to the minutes of the June 3 meeting – discussion for the other reasons PAHRA had raised.

In the meantime, all could still make use of the bilateral or multilateral relations each organization or institution has with CHR and/or PHRC as well as the HR offices of the security forces and of the involved government bodies and agencies. The NMM should cultivate and deepen the working relationship with a variety of organs of civil society, especially non-governmental organizations. This period will certainly help in
consolidating, strengthening and broadening our own internal mechanisms as preparation for our convergence.

On the composition of the NMM, independence, public legitimacy and accessibility of the NMM are all increased if there is diversity in the membership of the NMM including medical professionals, women and indigenous peoples.

 Assess with the parties involved and those interested the present and possible challenges to the compliance of monitoring incidents and/or cases of EJKs/ELKs and enforced disappearances, and, should address torture cases. Torture is rarely not perpetrated in the cases of enforced disappearance and ejk‟s / elk‟s.

 Factor in the lessons drawn from the Assessment both into the internal mechanisms of the institutions involved and into the NMM. The NMM while devising procedures to guarantee confidentiality as well as the presumption of innocence until proven guilty in the investigation process to the extent that is necessary for the protection of complainants and witnesses in view of the weaknesses of the witness protection program, the primacy of human rights should always be upheld. These lessons are meant to facilitate and strengthen the internal mechanisms of all participating parties in the NMM.

PAHRA remains your steadfast co-human rights defenders and partners that looks forward to working with all participants committed to establishing an effective National Monitoring Mechanism that would eventually progressively prevent, breakthrough and end impunity.

cc:
The Commission on Human Rights
c/o Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales
Ma. Victoria Cardona
Commissioner
Commission on Human Rights
Focal Commissioner
National Monitoring Mechanism (NMM)

Undersecretary Severo Catura
Executive Director
Presidential Human Rights Committee
Co-convenor, National Monitoring Mechanism
Representatives of Participating Government Agencies,
The AFP HRO, the PNP HRAO, Civil Society Human Rights
Formations

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